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Too YOUNG TO UNDERSTAND, BUT OLD ENOUGH TO
KNOW BETTER: DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF TRANSITION-
AGE YOUTH IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
ELIZABETH FORDYCEt
ABSTRACT
Older youth in the foster care system are often caught in the transi-
tion from childhood to adulthood. They are pushed to be independent in
a system that historically and jurisdictionally has existed because of their
dependency. Unlike their peers who may test responsibility, make mis-
takes, and learn from those mistakes in supportive environments, often-
times, the rules and court orders of foster care rigidly confine the day-to-
day existence of transition-age youth.
Current research around adolescent development and decision-
making capacity indicates that transition-age youth are neither children
nor adults. With the passage of the Preventing Sex Trafficking and
Strengthening Families Act (the SFA) in 2014, Congress opened the door
for states to adopt laws, policies, and practices more in line with the de-
velopmental stage of this age group. The law specifically requires states
to provide foster youth with a list of their rights with respect to educa-
tion, health, visitation, and court participation.
This Article critiques the SFA's rights provision in the context of
the juvenile court's historical underpinnings, the rights of parents and the
state, current developmental research, and common practice around older
youth transitions to adulthood. In doing so, this Article highlights the
legal paradox facing transition-age youth and questions the validity of
"rights" without enforcement. This Article emphasizes the need for cul-
ture change within the child welfare community to appropriately inte-
grate current research into policy and practice in the pursuit of achieving
better life outcomes for older youth transitioning from care.
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INTRODUCTION
For older youth in the foster care system, particularly those nearing
their emancipation, there exists a developmental paradox. They are
caught between the freedoms of childhood and the responsibilities of
adulthood.' They are still the subjects of legal proceedings where judges
and other professionals are making decisions in their "best interests" and
I. See JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, SUCCESS BEYOND 18: A BETTER
PATH FOR YOUNG PEOPLE TRANSITIONING FROM FOSTER CARE TO ADULTHOOD 2-3 (2013) [herein-
after JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18] (noting young people are legal adults at age eighteen, yet
still need support).
568 [Vol. 94:4
2017] DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF TRANSITION-AGE YOUTH 569
yet simultaneously encouraged to ready themselves for the challenges of
living on their own.2
The child welfare system as a whole has struggled to define the
rights and responsibilities of older youth in its care, specifically as com-
pared to the clearly delineated rights and interests of their parents and the
state at large. Indeed, transition-age youth3 in child welfare have a unique
hybrid status.
From the moment they enter foster care, the system and its many
players hold court hearings, visits, and meetings where decisions are
made for and on behalf of the youth.4 Court orders, rules of placement,
licensing regulations, and laws govern these youth's day-to-day lives. In
this system, the adults-judges, attorneys, caseworkers, Court Appointed
Special Advocates (CASAs), and others-assess and decide what is
"best" for them.5 These decisions, made by those who are in many ways
strangers, range in significance and include where youth can go to
school, whether they can have cell phones, who they can spend time
with, what extracurricular activities they can be involved in, whether
they can get driver's licenses, and many other life decisions, both big and
small.6 While youth may be a part of these decisions, too often they are
left on the outside, deemed "too young to understand" the concerns and
considerations of the adult professionals in their lives.7
At the same time, as these youth approach the age of eighteen, they
are expected to act more like adults.8 They participate in independent
living classes and create plans for housing, education, and employment.9
The system expects them to take advantage of the services and opportu-
2. Id. at 17-20; id. at 4 ("Young people in foster care must have opportunities to practice
decision-making and planning and gain increasing levels of autonomy.").
3. The definition of "transition-age youth" tends to vary by context and use. In this Article,
the Author specifically uses the term to reference youth, ages sixteen to twenty-one, who are in the
process of transitioning out of the foster care system.
4. Suparna Malempati, Beyond Paternalism: The Role of Counselfor Children in Abuse and
Neglect Proceedings, 11 U. N.H. L. REV. 97, 101 (2013) ("Under current juvenile law, the legal
principles that govern the operation of the juvenile dependency court are the best interests of the
child and family preservation.").
5. Id. at 102 ("The best interest standard is a child-centered principle that focuses on the
safety and well-being of the child.").
6. See id (recognizing best interest standard "directs and guides many court decisions about
appropriate outcomes for children").
7. See infra notes 330-35 and accompanying text (discussing the system's treatment of
youth as "outsiders").
8. See JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN: NEW
RESEARCH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE TRANSITIONING FROM FOSTER CARE 1
(2011) [hereinafter JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN] ("Unlike younger children in foster care,
for whom safety and protection are the greatest need, older youth are in the process of developing
greater autonomy and practicing adult roles and responsibilities.").
9. See Miriam Aroni Krinsky, A Not So Happy Birthday: The Foster Youth Transition from
Adolescence into Adulthood, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 250, 251 (2010) ("While the average age of financial
independence in America is twenty-six years of age, our current policies and practices are premised
on the presumption that foster youth can somehow attain financial and emotional independence by
age eighteen.").
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nities offered to them. Often, if a youth does not take advantage of those
services as decided by the state, then the state asks the court to dismiss
the case once the youth reaches age eighteen. When this happens, court
proceedings that were once designed to further the youth's well-being
and protection are often arbitrarily dismissed leaving the youth to fend
for him or herself. Indeed, when older youth in dependency proceedings
make mistakes, when they challenge rules, or otherwise act in disregard
of the court processes, they often hear that they are "old enough to know
better."10
These youth are stuck between childhood and adulthood, where the
laws of neither truly fit their situations. Historically, our federal and state
laws have not been crafted for flexibility, particularly with the nuances
necessary to address the stages of development for this age group.
In September 2014, Congress passed the Preventing Sex Trafficking
and Strengthening Families Act (the SFA), a law aimed at enhancing
engagement of older youth in their own dependency cases.12 Among its
many provisions, the SFA requires that each state provides foster chil-
dren under age fourteen a copy of their rights with respect to education,
health, visitation, and court participation.'3
This Article considers the SFA's "list of rights" provision in light of
the historical landscape and court culture surrounding children's rights in
dependency cases. If rights equate to status or value in court proceedings,
how does the SFA's provision fit with the current status of transition-age
youth in the foster care system? First, Part I summarizes the history of
the dependency court, its purpose, and the interests at stake in such cases.
Part II addresses the unique status of transition-age youth, from the
"magic" of adulthood at age eighteen to the state of research on adoles-
cent brain development and decision making. Part III analyzes the rights
of youth in dependency proceedings, the potential impact of the SFA's
rights provision, and the emergence of state Foster Care Bills of Rights.
Finally, this Article recognizes that he developmental needs of transi-
tion-age youth call for system reform with more flexible legal parame-
ters, greater advocacy on behalf of the direct wishes of youth, and an
overall change in child welfare culture.
10. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text (discussing the legal responsibilities of
young people upon reaching the age of majority).
11. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text (discussing the disconnect between rigid
jurisdictional statute in Colorado and developmental needs of transition-age youth).
12. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, § 113,
128 Stat. 1919, 1928-30 (2014).
13. Id. § 113(d).
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE DEPENDENCY COURT
A. The Underpinnings of a Child Welfare System
To fully understand the context of the rights-based culture in the
dependency courts, we must start by examining the origins of juvenile
law. The history of "[c]hildren's status can be viewed as a movement
from children as property, to children as welfare recipients, to children as
rights-based citizens."l4
In fact, the early inklings of family law date back to the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, where intervention into the family was justi-
fied both by the need to regulate poverty and the need to regulate
wealth.'5 Published in 1697, the "first English-language book on children
and the law, Law Both Ancient and Modern Relating to In-
fants, . . . described children as chattel."1 6 Children were the property of
their parents, and as property owners, parents could use and treat chil-
dren as they wished.17 At the time, for the wealthy classes, family law
was meant to ensure the "proper passage of wealth" and guarantee that
taxes were collected on such property.' For the poorer classes, laws al-
lowed the government to assume an obligation to care for children as an
"ultimate parent," and provided a mechanism for apprenticeship pro-
grams for such youth.19
The eighteenth century saw the American colonies adopt laws simi-
lar to the English Poor Laws,20 expanding the state's reach to removal of
poor children not solely due to their poverty, but also because "their par-
ents were not providing 'good breeding, neglecting their formal educa-
tion, not teaching a trade, or were idle, dissolute, unchristian or uncapa-
ble."'q21
With the industrialization era and the coming of the nineteenth cen-
tury, America responded with the "first great event" in child welfare: the
22
House of Refuge Movement. Many of these houses emerged not with
the intent of protecting children from their caretakers, but more so in an
14. Marvin Ventrell, The History of Child Welfare Law, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND
PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND
DEPENDENCY CASES 189, 193 (Donald N. Duquette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2016) (discussing the historical
development of children's rights).
15. Id. at 200 (noting driving social policies leading to early child welfare intervention).
1 6. Marvin Ventrell, From Cause to Profession: The Development of Children 's Law and
Practice, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2003, at 65, 66 (characterizing early views on children).
17. Id.
18. Ventrell, supra note 16, at 201 (discussing early interest of court or crown where patriarch
denied prior to heir's majority).
19. Id. at 201 (noting concepts emerging out of Elizabethan Poor Laws).
20. Id. (referencing "statutory scheme dealing with the custody of poor children").
21. Id. at 205 (quoting Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 212 (1971) (recognizing "poor plus" system of North American Poor
Laws)).
22. Id. at 208 (detailing the American response to urban poor children).
DENVER LAWREVIEW
effort to address poverty as a major cause of vagrancy and criminal acts
by children.2 3
B. Parens Patriae and the Child Savers
Ultimately, the judicial system validated the efforts of the House of
Refuge Movement, and through a series of cases, established a practice
of state intervention into the private family unit through the doctrine of
parens patriae.24 Parens patriae, meaning "ultimate parent or parent of
the country," provided a basis for the "state's authority and obligation to
save children from being criminal."25 It has continued to serve as the
foundation upon which the modem juvenile court is based.26 As our
United States Supreme Court has noted: "Children, by definition, are not
assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are as-
sumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control
falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae."27
In an early documented opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considered the case of Mary Ann Crouse, a child incarcerated at the Phil-
adelphia House of Refuge because she was beyond her parent's control.28
In dicta, the court discussed the state's authority to intervene: "To this
end may not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of education,
or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens patriae, or common
guardian of the community? . .. The right of parental control is a natural,
,,2 30but not an unalienable one."2 9 Other courts similarly adopted this view,
and the parens patriae doctrine thereafter became the cornerstone of
juvenile law.31
Just as the courts were adopting the parens patriae paradigm, "child
savers" were also making their mark on the development of juvenile law
in the nineteenth century.32 These were individuals dedicated to saving
"those less fortunately placed in the social order."33 Largely consisting of
"bourgeois wom[e]n," the movement sought to instill "white, Protestant,
middle-class values" into children so that they could "become proper
citizens."34
23. Id. at 208-09 ("The movement began with the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism,
which believed that poverty was a cause, if not the primary cause, of crime committed by chil-
dren.").
24. Id. at 210 (noting early court involvement in juvenile matters).
25. Id. (defining state intervention).
26. See In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635-37 (Ind. 2004) (providing historical perspective of
juvenile court).
27. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (describing role of parents and State).
28. Ventrell, supra note 16, at 211 (citing Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 10 (Pa. 1839)).
29. Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11 (detailing parens patriae authority of the State).
30. Ventrell, supra note 16, at 214-17 (discussing cases of Emily and Mary Ellen).
31. Id. at 218 (analyzing development ofjuvenile court philosophy).
32. Id. (noting Progressive Era movement of "Child Saving").
33. Id. (defining "movement").
34. Id. at 191-92 (providing underlying views of movement).
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The work of the child savers and the parens patriae movement cul-
minated in the creation of the juvenile court. In 1899, Cook County,
Illinois, formally opened the first juvenile court, which served as the
model for subsequent juvenile courts across the country.36 Under the
juvenile court, the parens patriae doctrine justified both delinquency and
dependency intervention.37
C. The Fundamental Rights ofParents
In addition to the judicially-embraced parens patriae authority of
the state, a historical look at U.S. Supreme Court opinions also details a
clear recognition of a parent's fundamental right-under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution-to the care,
custody, and control of his or her children.3 8
This recognition of parents' rights by the Court began in 1923 with
the case of Meyer v. Nebraska,39 where a teacher was criminally charged
for teaching German to a student (at the parents' request) in violation of
a statute prohibiting the teaching of a language other than English to
children who had not yet completed eighth grade.40 Here, the Court in-
terpreted the concept of liberty to include a parent's right to "establish a
home and bring up children.' I
The Court continued to solidify this fundamental right of parents to
their children through a series of cases, including, among others, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters,4 2 Wisconsin v. Yoder,43 Santosky v. Kramer,4 and
Troxel v. Granville.5 With each case, the Court distinctly defined the
right as a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of
46
the children. This right of parents rests on two essential presumptions:
"(1) parents possess what children lack in areas of functioning, and (2)
parents' love and affection for their children generally causes parents to
35. Id. at 219 (detailing history ofjuvenile court formation).
36. Id.
37. Id. (recognizing that juvenile court had authority both to handle delinquent behavior and
to protect dependent children).
38. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (recognizing parents' rights to children as
"perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court").
39. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
40. Id. at 396-97 (reciting facts of case); see also Ann M. Haralambie, U.S. Supreme Court
Cases Regarding Child Welfare, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING
CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES, supra
note 14, at 275, 277 (discussing Supreme Court recognition of parental rights).
41. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (defining rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
42. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (recognizing right to direct education of children).
43. 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (upholding parents' right to free exercise of religion for chil-
dren).
44. 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.").
45. 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (detailing constitutional case law on the fundamental right of
parents to children).
46. See id (providing a historical account of Supreme Court parental right cases).
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act in their children's best interests."A7 While of constitutional magni-
tude, these rights are not absolute, thereby allowing intrusion by the state
under parens patriae authority.4 8
D. Children as Subjects
At each historical junction detailed above, the focus was on the state
as the "protector of the helpless or less fortunate."4 9 The role of children
throughout was either as property or as the beneficiary of assistance.so
The juvenile system has consistently "held a paternalistic view of chil-
dren because of their status as minors and because of societal concerns
for child welfare."5 1 Because children have historically been viewed as
dependents and not individuals, the role of the juvenile court has been to
"dictate[] the appropriate outcomes for children without regard for the
child's rights and without consideration of the child's point of view."52
E. Gault and the Delinquent Child
The broad scope of a court's authority under the parens patriae doc-
trine continued, largely unfettered, until the U.S. Supreme Court's case
of In re Gault5 3 in 1967.54 The Gault Court authored the now famous line
in the historical shift from youth as welfare recipients to youth as rights-
based individuals: "[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is- for adults alone."5 5 In the case, the Court considered the proce-
dural due process rights of fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault, who was ar-
rested based upon a neighbor's complaint that Gault and his friends made
indecent remarks to her on the phone.6 The Gault Court held that a trial
court's "exercise of the power of the state as parens patriae was not un-
limited[,]" 5 7 and recognized that juveniles, like adults, have due process
rights to "notice of charges, confrontation and cross-examination, prohi-
bition against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel."
47. Jennifer K. Smith, Comment, Putting Children Last: How Washington Has Failed to
Protect the Dependent Child's Best Interest in Visitation, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 769, 776 (2009)
(addressing bases for parental rights doctrine).
48. See Haralambie, supra note 40, at 277 (noting limit to parental rights); see also Smith,
supra note 47, at 776-77 (same).
49. See Malempati, supra note 4, at 100 (depicting State as parent).
50. See Ventrell, supra note 16, at 201 (characterizing history of children's rights).
51. Malempati, supra note 4, at 100 (emphasis added) (describing parens patriae view of
juvenile court).
52. Id. (emphasis added) (noting limited role of child in court process).
53. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
54. See Ventrell, supra note 16, at 221 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967)).
55. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
56. Id. at 4 (providing facts of case).
57. Id. at 30 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966)).
58. See Ventrell, supra note 16, at 221 (detailing juvenile due process rights recognized in
Gault).
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Seen by some as a "great advancement in children's rights",5 9 with
Gault, the "parens patriae authority essentially disappeared from the
delinquency court context" thereafter distinguishing the court's involve-
ment with juveniles in delinquency cases from the experiences of youth
in dependency court.60 Despite the marked change in delinquency mat-
ters, "Gault did not dismantle, or even limit, the parens patriae authority
of the dependency court." 61 Children in dependency cases "remained the
beneficiaries of the court's parens patriae authority," but the view shift-
ed from youth as pre-delinquents to youth needing protection from mal-
treatment.6 2
F. Today's Dependency Court
Today, the parens patriae doctrine continues to provide courts with
63
the authority to act in the best interests of children. In many ways, the
court's adherence to its paternalistic view of children "has impeded the
progress of the juvenile court into an effective rights-based system, par-
ticularly in the area of dependency cases."64 The dependency system
continues to pose "a struggle between the rights of parents to maintain
family autonomy and the rights of the state to intervene and protect the
interests of a child in cases of abuse and neglect. Little attention, howev-
er, is paid to the affirmative rights that children have in the dependency
context."65
II. THE STATUS OF OLDER YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE
In the world of parents' rights, state intervention, and children need-
ing protection, older youth sit on a fence with one foot still dangling in
the days of their childhood and the other stretching to touch the ground
of adulthood. As of September 2015, approximately twenty-six percent
of youth in foster care were age fourteen and older.66 A prior report de-
termined that youth over age fourteen "remain in foster care at least
twice as long as the total foster care population, on average."67 During
fiscal year 2015, over 20,000 youth exited the system through emancipa-
59. Id.
60. Kelly Crecco, Striking a Balance: Freedom of the Press Versus Children's Privacy Inter-
ests in Juvenile Dependency Hearings, II FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 490, 495-96 (2013) (describing
historical separation of juvenile court proceedings).
61. Ventrell, supra note 16, at 221.
62. Crecco, supra note 60, at 496 (emphasizing change in view of dependent children).
63. In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 636 (Ind. 2004) (recognizing parens patriae jurisdiction);
Smith, supra note 47, at 778 (recognizing parens patriae jurisdiction).
64. Malempati, supra note 4, at 101.
65. Smith, supra note 47, at 778 (providing that children's rights are often overlooked).
66. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT
1 (2016).
67. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 8.
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tion, heading out to the world on their own.68 For these youth, emancipa-
tion meant having "left care without a legally sanctioned permanent fam-
ily relationship to offer guidance and support as they made the transition
into adulthood."69
Before we can evaluate the rights belonging to transition-age youth,
we must first consider their place in the current dependency landscape,
including their stages of development, their potential outcomes as inter-
dependent adults, and the laws pertaining to their age group.
A. Emerging Adulthood: A New Developmental Stage
Contrary to laws across the country, developmentally, there is no
magic transformation from adolescent o adult on one's eighteenth birth-
day.70 Adulthood is not a moment in time event, but rather the culmina-
tion of a gradual process of growth and preparation.7 1
Erik Erikson, a German-born American psychoanalyst who estab-
lished an eight-stage theory to healthy psychosocial development from
infancy to death,72 described this transition-age period in two parts: the
adolescent stage (from ages twelve to eighteen) and the young adulthood
stage (from ages nineteen to forty).73 In the adolescent stage, youth
struggle between identity and role confusion.74 This is the time when
youth are sorting through "beliefs, values, and ideals" to determine who
they are.7 5 This period is also when youth develop a sense of self-
sufficiency.76 Then, in the young adulthood stage, the young person
77seeks to develop intimacy and avoid isolation. For Erickson, these are
two distinct developmental events.
Research has come to show, however, that "young people do not
move seamlessly from adolescence at age 18 to young adulthood at age
68. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 66, at 3; MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST
EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: CONDITIONS OF YOUTH
PREPARING TO LEAVE STATE CARE 3 (2004).
69. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 8-9.
70. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (noting arbitrary nature of age eighteen
as dividing line between childhood and adulthood).
71. See MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF
FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 26, at 1 (2011) (describing transition to adulthood);
see also JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing adolescence as a develop-
mental stage).
72. See Richard 0. Brooks, "The Refurbishing": Reflections upon Law and Justice Among the
Stages ofLife, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 619, 650-51 (2006) (recounting Erikson's theory of development).
73. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 15 fig.1 (presenting Erikson's
stages).
74. Id. (noting psychosocial crisis of each stage); see Brooks, supra note 72, at 652 tbl.1
(describing psychosocial modality as "to be oneself (or not to be)").
75. Andrea Corn & Howard Raab, Age-Appropriate Time Sharing for Divorced Parents, 81
FLA. B.J. 84, 86 (2007) (detailing the psychosocial stage of adolescence).
76. Id.
77. See JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAiN, supra note 8, at 15 fig.1 (presenting Erikson's
stages).
78. Id. (highlighting seven stages).
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19, as the traditional model might suggest."79 Many now support the
concept that there is instead a transition process of "emerging adult-
hood," ranging roughly from age eighteen to age twenty-five.8 0 Emerging
adulthood does not occur at some pre-determined age, but rather repre-
sents the time period when youth are moving towards greater independ-
ence.
B. Adolescent Brain Development and the Impact of Trauma
Over the last decade, neuroscience research has demonstrated that
82
the adolescent brain is not the same as the adult brain. In fact, it was
previously believed that brain development was complete by age six.83
Research now shows, however, that adolescence is a second wave of
significant brain growth and development.84 This development begins at
puberty and stretches all the way to the mid-twenties.85 For a young
woman, the brain generally reaches full maturity between ages twenty-
one and twenty-two.86 For a young man, this point is not reached until
almost age thirty.87
Neuroscience rests on several key principles of brain architecture,
as articulated by Harvard University's Center on the Developing Child.88
They include the following concepts:
* Brains are built over time, from the bottom up.
* Brain architecture is comprised of billions of connections between
individual neurons across different areas of the brain.
* The interactions of genes and experience shape the developing
brain.
* Cognitive, emotional, and social capacities are inextricably inter-
twined throughout the life course.89
79. Id. at 15 (noting changing research on adolescent development).
80. Id. at 15-16, 16 fig.2 (recognizing new developmental stage).
81. Id. at 15-16 (defining stage).
82. Id. at 20 (highlighting distinctions in brain development).
83. Id. at 2 (noting historical assumption on brain development).
84. See Gene Griffin, Child Development and the Impact of Abuse and Neglect, in CHILD
WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN
ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES, supra note 14, at 69, 80 (referencing research of Jay N.
Giedd and others); see also DANIEL R. WEINBERGER ET AL., THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN: A WORK IN
PROGRESS 1 (2005) (recognizing "profound brain growth and change" during adolescence).
85. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 20 (defining period of develop-
ment).
86. Id. at 22 (detailing female development).
87. Id. (defining male development).
88. Griffin, supra note 84, at 79 (referencing Ctr. on the Developing Child, Brain Architec-
ture, HARV. U., http://developingchild.harvard.edu/science/key-concepts/brain-architecture (last
visited July 6, 2017)).
89. Id. (articulating key concepts of brain architecture).
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Beginning at puberty, a number of important changes in the adoles-
cent brain occur.90 First, the prefrontal cortex gradually develops.91 This
is the part of the frontal lobe that is responsible for functions such as
"reasoning, decision making, judgment, and impulse control ... ."92 It is
the last part of the brain to reach full development.93 As the prefrontal
cortex develops, youth become less dependent on the limbic system-
"the emotional center of the brain"-when making decisions.94
Second, during adolescence, the brain changes its production of do-
pamine-the "chemical that links action to pleasure[.j" 9 5 When this oc-
curs, youth need to reach a higher threshold of stimulus prior to feeling
pleasure.96 As a result, they seek new excitement and risk.97
Third, adolescence is the period of "use it or lose it." 98 During this
time, the gray matter of the brain starts to thin as the synapses-"links
between neurons that transmit and receive information"-undergo a
pruning process.99 Those synapses that are frequently used become
stronger and more established through a process called myelination.0 0
Those that are unused are pruned away.'0 Through this process, youth
may lose as many as 30,000 synapses per second over the entire cerebral
cortex. 102
Young people in the foster care system undergo this developmental
process just as their peers, yet many are simultaneously impacted by pri-
or trauma. 13 Specifically, youth who have experienced physical or emo-
90. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 20-23, 23 figs.3 & 4 (describing
impact of brain development on adolescent functioning).
91. Id. at 20-21 (defining "prefrontal cortex" as "part of the brain that governs a person's
executive functions").
92. Id. at 20; see WEINBERGER ET AL., supra note 84, at I (listing prefrontal cortex functions
as "setting priorities, organizing plans and ideas, forming strategies, controlling impulses, and allo-
cating attention").
93. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 20; WEINBERGER ET AL., supra
note 84, at 1.
94. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 20 (explaining the transition from
emotional to rational decision making).
95. Id. at 21; WEINBERGER ET AL., supra note 84, at 1 (discussing "one of the neuronal mech-
anisms that increase[s] the capacity for more mature judgment and impulse control").
96. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 21-22 (describing the functional
impact of chemical change).
97. Id. (explaining changing behavior of adolescents based on dopamine increase during this
period).
98. Id. at 22 (highlighting a critical mechanism for brain resiliency).
99. Id; see also WEINBERGER ET AL., supra note 84, at 11-12, 12 fig. 3 (depicting the cutting
back of "inefficient or ineffective connections to achieve maximal efficiency of function").
100. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 22; WEINBERGER ET AL., supra
note 84, at 11 ("Like Michelangelo starting with a block of granite and eliminating rock to create the
masterpiece David, certain connections are strengthened and others eliminated--in essence, brain
functions are sculpted to reveal and allow increasing maturity in thought and action.").
101. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 22.
102. Id. (detailing extent of myelination process).
103. Griffin, supra note 84, at 80 (recognizing that adverse childhood experiences may cause
short or long term developmental damage).
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tional abuse may suffer disrupted or delayed brain development.104 These
delays may negatively impact he behavioral, emotional, or social devel-
opment of youth.1 0 5
The beautiful phenomenon of the brain rewiring during adoles-
cence, through the "use it or lose it" processes, however, means that it is
possible for the effects of trauma to be offset.106 The brain has great neu-
roplasticity, or resiliency, during this period.107 When a youth has correc-
tive experiences and supportive relationships during this time, the
youth's brain will literally rewire and create new neural connections.1os
On the other hand, the failure to provide opportunities to establish resili-
ency means that those neural pathways may be lost.109 The manner by
which the system supports and facilitates the transition to adulthood for
older youth in the foster care system is indeed crucial to their future well-
being and success.
C. The Midwest Study
The challenges faced by those exiting the foster care system are
well-documented through the Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Function-
ing of Former Foster Youth (Midwest Study).110 A longitudinal study
conducted by researchers at Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago,
the Midwest Study followed a sample of young people (initial baseline
interviews of 732) from Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa as they transi-
tioned from the foster care system into adulthood."' Researchers inter-
viewed the youth participants at ages seventeen or eighteen years old,
with repeat interviews conducted at ages nineteen, twenty-one, twenty-
three or twenty-four, and twenty-six.1 12 The study compared the out-
comes of foster youth across a variety of domains to the outcomes of
their nonfoster care peers, who were documented through the National
104. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 25 (acknowledging that completion
of brain development may occur later for youth impacted by trauma).
105. Id. (noting the impact of trauma).
106. Id. at 27 (emphasizing room for brain healing during time period).
107. Id. at 27-28 (explaining that the brain is not hard-wired by age three as previously be-
lieved).
108. Id. at 28 (recognizing that rewiring occurs with healthy, supportive relationships and
experiential learning opportunities); see also JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18, supra note 1, at 8
("Neuroscience makes clear that support during the cognitive, social, and emotional development
processes of adolescence and emerging adulthood can lead to healthy and constructive adulthood.").
109. See JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 22 (describing the pruning
process).
110. Mark E. Courtney et al., Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster
Youth, CHAPIN HALL, http://www.chapinhall.org/research/report/midwest-evaluation-adult-
functioning-former-foster-youth (last visited July 6, 2017) (providing full PDFs of Midwest Study
reports).
111. COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 3 (setting forth parameters of study).
112. Id. at 4 (detailing survey waves).
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Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).113 Former foster
youth struggled across the board in the comparisons.114
Youth growing up outside of the foster care system generally bene-
fit from the support of family, both financially and emotionally. 15 It is
estimated that "parents provide their young adult children with material
assistance totaling approximately $38,000 between the ages of 18 and
34."ll6 Meanwhile, foster youth enter the adult world without the same
built-in safety nets. The study found that "[o]n many dimensions that
would be of concern to the typical parent, [the young people in the Mid-
west Study were] faring poorly as a group."'
In addition, young people interviewed through the Midwest Study
were much less likely to be living with their biological parents than their
peers.18 In fact, in a separate 2003 survey, about fifty-five percent of
young men and forty-six percent of women (outside of the foster care
system) between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four were living with at
least one of their parents.1 9 Meanwhile, since exiting foster care, about
eighteen percent of former foster youth had experienced homelessness at
least once between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one.120
The Midwest Study demonstrated similarly poor outcomes for for-
mer foster youth in areas of education and employment.121 Nearly a quar-
ter of the Midwest Study youth did not graduate high school or obtain
their General Educational Development (GED) by age twenty-one as
compared to eleven percent of their Add Health peers.122 Moreover, only
thirty percent of Midwest Study youth completed any college compared
to fifty-three percent of Add Health youth.12 3 Fewer young people in the
Midwest Study were employed, on average, as compared to their peers,
and their peers generally earned about one dollar more per hour than the
former foster youth.124 The median earnings among those Midwest Study
113. Id at 5 (explaining comparison groups).
114. See id. at 6 ("Across a wide range of outcome measures, including postsecondary educa-
tional attainment, employment, housing stability, public assistance receipt, and criminal justice
system involvement, these former foster youth are faring poorly as a group.").
115. See MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF
FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 21, at 5 (2007) (citation omitted) (describing ongoing
support of family during transition years).
116. Id. (quantifying parental support to young people).
117. Id. at 83 ("If the outcomes of these young adults were assessed through the same lens that
most U.S. parents would use to view the progress of their own children, the findings presented here
should be very troubling.").
118. Id. at 14 (noting that former foster youth were more likely to be living with relatives than
biological parents compared to their peers).
119. Id. at 5 (highlighting parental support in housing).
120. Id. at 15 (recognizing homelessness as problem experienced by former foster youth often
more than once).
121. Id. at 26-37 (detailing survey results in education and employment areas for former foster
youth at age twenty-one).
122. Id. at 26 (providing results on educational achievement).
123. Id. (stating survey results regarding post-secondary education pursuits).
124. See id at 31-32 (comparing employment outcomes for former foster youth and peers).
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youth who were employed was only $5,450 at the age of twenty-one, as
compared to the $9,120 made by their peers.125 A significant amount of
the young people in the Midwest Study benefited from public assistance
of some kind.126
Former foster youth in the study were also more likely to receive
mental health counseling and substance abuse treatment, to become
pregnant, and to become involved with the criminal justice system.127
While the Midwest Study noted a number of devastating outcomes
for the former foster youth population, it also acknowledged several
strengths, including the youth's ability to "exhibit extraordinary opti-
mism and high aspirations," as well as close relationships with members
of their biological family. 12 8 In addition to comparisons to their Add
Health peers, the Midwest Study provided researchers the opportunity to
compare the outcomes of youth exiting foster care in Illinois to those
exiting in Wisconsin and Iowa.12 9 At the time, Illinois was the only state
of the three to allow youth to remain in foster care until age twenty-one
as opposed to age eighteen.13 0 The study found that with more time in
foster care-and perhaps more supportive opportunities to rewire their
brain and heal past trauma-youth had better life outcomes across sever-
al domains.
D. The Federal Legislative Landscape
The Midwest Study provided a look at the impact of existing federal
law targeted towards transition-age youth, as well as an impetus for fu-
ture legislative change.
In 1986, Congress amended Title IV-E of the Social Security Act,
creating an Independent Living Program utilizing federal dollars to help
states support older youth in the foster care system in their transition to
adulthood.13 2 Subsequently, in 1999, Congress passed the Foster Care
Independence Act (Chafee Act), 13 3 which created the John Chafee Foster
Care Independence Program. The Chafee Act doubled the federal fund-
ing available to states for independent living purposes and expanded
125. Id. at 35 (distinguishing groups based on income).
126. See id at 38-39 (explaining survey results regarding receipt of government benefits).
127. Id. at 44-46 (mental health and substance abuse treatment); id at 50-53 (pregnancy); id.
at 64-67 (criminal justice system involvement).
128. Id. at 84 (reviewing positive results gathered by study).
129. See id at 87 (comparing Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin systems).
130. Id. (noting Illinois' extended care system).
131. See id. at 87-88 (recognizing benefit of longer transition period from foster care system
while acknowledging need for further time to study impact of law); see also Courtney et al., supra
note 110.
132. Frank E. Vandervort, Federal Legislation Protecting Children and Providing for Their
Well-Being, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND
STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES, supra note 14, at 231, 253 (detail-
ing congressional response to transition of older youth from foster care).
133. John H. Chaffee Foster Care Independence Program, 42 U.S.C. § 677 (2012).
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youth eligibility for services.134 It also provided vouchers for post-
secondary education and vocational training.135 In part, researchers in-
tended the Midwest Study to look at how foster youth were transitioning
to adulthood since the Chafee Act became law.
136
The initial stages of the Midwest Study informed further federal
policy change related to this population.13 7 In 2008, Congress passed the
Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act (the
Fostering Connections Act), which formally recognized the benefit of
providing older youth in care additional time for their transitions.' 3 The
Fostering Connections Act amended the definition of "child" in Title IV-
E of the Social Security Act.1 3 9 The new definition included young peo-
ple up to age twenty-one (instead of terminating services at age eight-
een), if the young person was engaged in one of four activities: (1) com-
pleting high school or a GED program, (2) enrolled in college or voca-
tional school, (3) participating in a program to remove employment bar-
riers, or (4) employed at least eighty hours per month.14 0 Young people
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one were also eligible to remain
in care if they were incapable of performing the four activities previously
listed due to a medical condition.14 1
Following this policy change under the Fostering Connections Act,
states were eligible to receive federal funding to reimburse the costs of
foster care for youth in this transition-age group, as of 2011.142 A number
of states then modified their local laws to match this expanded definition
of child.143 In many ways, this change marked an awareness that young
people exiting foster care, just like their non-foster care peers, need time
to achieve their goals, make permanent connections or achieve legal
permanency, learn from mistakes, and develop new skills or supports.14 4
States continue to work towards effective implementation of the Foster-
ing Connections Act, particularly addressing whether policies and prac-
134. COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 115, at 5 (providing account of federal legislation).
135. Id. (discussing services provided by Chafee Act).
136. Id. at 6 (identifying one goal of the Midwest Study).
137. COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 2 (noting impact of Midwest Study on federal legisla-
tion).
138. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
351, 122 Stat. 3949.
139. Id. § 201(a) (extending the definition of "child" under federal law).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 675(8)(B)(iv)(I)-(IV) (2012) (highlighting eligibility requirements).
141. Id. § 675(8)(B)(iv)(V) (recognizing a medical condition exception).
142. See JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18, supra note 1, at 10 (providing recommendations to
leverage federal funding from Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoption Act).
143. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 388.1, 11400(aa) (West 2017) (defining non-
minor dependent status for older youth); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-4501 to -4514 (2017) (establishing
Young Adult Bridge to Independence Act); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (2017) (defining "child").
144. See JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18, supra note 1, at 7-9 (describing needs of transition-
age youth and appropriate design for foster care system support).
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tices are developmentally-appropriate for this transition-age popula-
145tion.
E. The Research on Adolescent Decision Making
Just as the delinquency courts were first to adopt the view of chil-
dren as "rights-based" individuals, so too have other courts been willing
to consider the research on adolescent development.146 In 2005, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons,147 held that the death pen-
alty for those under age eighteen at the time of their convictions was
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion.148 In so finding, the Court took ample time to analyze research on
the developmental differences between youth and adults.149 The Court
noted three key differences.150 First, youth tend to exhibit a "lack of ma-
turity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility" more often than
adults, "qualities [which] often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions."'5 1 In fact, "adolescents are overrepresented statis-
tically in virtually every category of reckless behavior." 5 2
Second, juveniles are more susceptible to peer pressure or other out-
side negative influences.5 3 They have less control over their own envi-
ronments.154 Third, their character is less well-formed or fixed than that
of adults.'55 With these principles in mind, the Court determined that
"[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked
and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the
death penalty despite insufficient culpability."'56
Following the Court's Roper opinion in 2005, the American Psy-
chological Association (APA) faced criticism for what some viewed as
inconsistent positions on adolescent decision making.15 7 The Roper
Court, in its ultimate opinion and accompanying analysis of adolescent
development, heavily relied upon the APA's position that adolescents are
145. See id at 3 (emphasizing the need to extend foster care jurisdiction based on "unique
developmental tasks of [adolescent] life stage and their legal status as adults").
146. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors'Access
to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA "Flip-Flop," 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
583, 583-86 (2009) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's reliance on adolescent development
research).
147. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
148. See id at 578-79 (stating holding).
149. See id at 569-73 (differentiating the judgmental capacity of adults from adolescents).
150. Id. at 569-70 (noting "general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults").
151. Id at 569 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993)) (highlighting the first distinction between adults and adolescents).
152. Id (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspec-
tive, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 339, 339 (1992)) (noting recklessness of adolescence).
153. Id. (describing the second distinction between adolescents and adults).
154. Id (explaining juvenile susceptibility to outside influence).
155. Id. at 570 (recognizing the third distinction between adults and adolescents).
156. Id. at 572-73 (analyzing developmental research in context of death penalty sentence).
157. See Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 583-84 (describing alleged inconsistency of APA's
positions on adolescents).
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less mature than adults in terms of criminal responsibility.15 ' In 1990,
however, the APA asserted in Hodgson v. Minnesota" that "because
adolescents had decision-making skills comparable to those of adults,
there was no reason to require teenagers to notify their parents before
terminating a pregnancy."I60 To many, these two briefs represented con-
tradictory positions on the developmental capacity of young people. 61In
fact, however, these two positions can be reconciled through careful
analysis of existing research.
162
Following these cases, a number of researchers from the MacArthur
Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile
Justice considered age differences in many cognitive and psychosocial
capacities.163 Researchers determined:
[W]hereas adolescents and adults perform comparably on cognitive
tests measuring the sorts of cognitive abilities that were referred to in
the [APA's] Hodgson brief-abilities that permit logical reasoning
about moral, social, and interpersonal matters-adolescents and
adults are not of equal maturity with respect to the psychosocial ca-
pacities listed by Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion in Roper-
capacities such as impulse control and resistance to peer influence.16
Indeed, studies show that there are no "appreciable differences" in
logical reasoning or competency-related abilities between youth age six-
teen and older and adults.165 On the other hand, "psychosocial character-
istics such as impulsivity, sensation seeking, future orientation, and sus-
ceptibility to peer pressure" continue to develop "well beyond middle
adolescence and even into young adulthood... ."166
The MacArthur Juvenile Capacity Study demonstrated: "By age 16,
adolescents' general cognitive abilities are essentially indistinguishable
from those of adults, but adolescents' psychosocial functioning, even at
the age of 18, is significantly less mature than that of individuals in their
mid-20s."l67 This analysis affirmed the allegedly contradictory views of
158. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-73 (analyzing case in light of adolescent development re-
search); see also Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 583 (detailing the Roper analysis of the APA's
position).
159. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
160. Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 584 (citation omitted) (referencing Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)).
161. See id ("Justice Kennedy explicitly asked at oral argument in Roper if the APA had 'flip-
flopped' between 1989 (when its final amicus brief was filed in the abortion case) and 2004 (when
its brief was filed in the juvenile death penalty case).").
162. See id. at 584-87 (reconciling APA positions).
163. Id. at 585 (establishing the reason for MacArthur Juvenile Capacity Study).
164. Id. at 586 (summarizing findings that distinguish cognitive capacity from psychosocial
capacity in decision making).
165. Id. (recognizing the similarity between adults and older youth in logical decision making
abilities).
166. Id. at 587 (describing age differences in psychosocial characteristics).
167. Id. at 592 (presenting study findings).
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the APA in its briefs in Hodgson and Roper.168 The distinction in deci-
sion making is clear:
When it comes to decisions that permit more deliberative, reasoned
decision making, where emotional and social influences on judgment
are minimized or can be mitigated, and where there are consultants
who can provide objective information about the costs and benefits of
alternative courses of action, adolescents are likely to be just as capa-
ble of mature decision making as adults, at least by the time they are
16....
In contrast, in situations that elicit impulsivity, that are typically
characterized by high levels of emotional arousal or social coercion,
or that do not encourage or permit consultation with an expert who is
more knowledgeable or experienced, adolescents' decision making,
at least until they have turned 18, is likely to be less mature than
adults'.169
Certainly, the United States Supreme Court appreciated these dis-
tinctions in adopting the APA research, both in Hodgson-where the
Court upheld the right of adolescents to seek abortions without parental
consent-and in Roper-where the Court rejected the juvenile death
penalty.170
These studies, however, create space for similar discussions on ado-
lescent decision making in the dependency arena. In terms of cognitive
abilities, foster youth over age sixteen are capable of logical reasoning
equivalent to that of adults.'7 ' They can engage in case-planning and
legal decision making when they have adult support to advise them
through this process.172
In contrast, the studies call into question the psychosocial abilities
of youth to make decisions when emotions are high, peer pressure exists,
and adult consultation is absent.173 These include decisions such as driv-
ing without a license, purchasing drugs or alcohol, or engaging in sexual
activity.174 The lack of maturity with these types of decisions does not
negate responsibility or justify actions, but rather, demonstrates the need
for greater restraint or added protection to help transition-age youth nay-
168. See id. at 586 ("[W]e believe that APA's seemingly contradictory positions in Hodgson
and Roper are in fact quite compatible with research on age differences in cognitive and psychoso-
cial capacities.").
169. Id. at 592 (highlighting contextual differences in decision making abilities of adolescents).
170. See id at 583-84 (describing distinctions in adolescent ability in the context of Supreme
Court holdings).
171. Cf id. at 592 (discussing mature decision making of adolescents in medical, legal, and
research study contexts).
172. Cf id. (noting adolescent capability in "legal decision making (where legal practitioners,
such as defense attorneys, can play a comparable role)").
173. See id at 592-93 (emphasizing lack of mature decision making from adolescents in par-
ticular contexts).
174. See id at 593 (providing examples of immature decision making contexts).
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igate these events.175 Indeed, in some ways, transition-age youth are both
old enough to understand and yet not always old enough to know better.
To adequately meet the needs of young people as they transition in-
to adulthood, we must design a system that recognizes these distinctions.
III. DEFINING THE RIGHTS (AND RESPONSIBILITIES) OF OLDER YOUTH IN
DEPENDENCY CASES
A. The Legal Significance ofAge Eighteen
While the age of eighteen does not indicate any magical, transform-
ative experience in the journey from child to adult, particularly as re-
search on adolescent development now notes an emerging adulthood
spanning all the way to age twenty-five, the legal system, for all intents
and purposes, views the age of eighteen as a significant marker.176 Even
as the Roper Court carefully weighed the research on distinctions be-
tween capacities of adolescents and adults, it fell back to eighteen as its
default.7 7
The majority described the difficulty: "The qualities that distinguish
juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By
the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity
some adults will never reach."17 8 Ultimately, the Court found that "a line
must be drawn[,]" and that "[t]he age of 18 is the point where society
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood."l7 9
At the age of eighteen, young people assume a number of "rights"
in our country. In almost every state, by the age of eighteen young peo-
ple are eligible to vote in elections or serve on juries.'so At eighteen,
young people can enlist to fight in our military, or even marry, without
their parents' consent.i18
Turning eighteen also means that young people may be legally re-
sponsible for their actions in ways they never have been before.'82 If they
commit a criminal offense, they subject themselves to the adult criminal
175. Cf id. at 592 (describing immature decision making due to lack of consultation with
knowledgeable or experience expert).
176. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (determining age of eighteen to be a divid-
ing line between juveniles and adults).
177. Id. (noting need to draw line of distinction).
178. Id. (recognizing subjectivity of choosing eighteen as age of distinction).
179. Id. (explaining Court's analysis in deciding upon eighteen as "age at which the line for
death eligibility ought to rest").
180. See id apps. B & C (listing state laws on voting and jury service).
181. See id. app. D (referencing state laws on marriage without parental consent); see also 10
U.S.C. § 505(a) (2012) ("[N]o person under eighteen years of age may be originally enlisted without
the written consent of his parent or guardian . . . .").
182. See Krinsky, supra note 9, at 250 (recognizing eighteen as "time of change" where "youth
can exercise the right to vote, enlist in the military, and sign legal documents").
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system and face corresponding consequences.'83 In most states, the age
of eighteen is considered the age of majority.184 Upon reaching majority,
young people can legally enter into contracts or sign apartment leases.'85
If they lapse in payments or responsibilities under these agreements, they
face the repercussions.
Yet despite these "coming of age" rights and responsibilities in
many areas of our legal system, the dependency systems across our coun-
try are not consistent in taking note of any change to the young person's
legal status. Even following the Fostering Connections Act, some states
continue to use age eighteen as the end of a court's intervention or legal
jurisdiction over youth.186 For young people in these states, services may
be provided by means of administrative programs, yet there no longer
remains any legal enforceability for such services as youth begin to tack-
le the world of adulthood.'
In other states, the dependency system has extended jurisdiction
over young people until the age of twenty-one, yet there is no marked
difference in how the dependency court system treats those young people
as they cross the threshold of eighteen. In Colorado, for example, the
continuing jurisdiction statute reads, "the jurisdiction of the court over
any child adjudicated as neglected or dependent shall continue until he
becomes twenty-one years of age unless earlier terminated by court or-
der."'8 8 Prior to a youth's eighteenth birthday, the Colorado court should
consider the activities outlined in the Fostering Connections Act to assess
whether the youth needs more time after age eighteen to stay within the
dependency court's jurisdiction.1 Nothing about the youth's status,
however, actually changes at eighteen.190 Furthermore, prior to eighteen,
youth in foster care in Colorado receive an attorney, not to represent their
183. See United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 2013) ("The Supreme Court's
decisions limiting the types of sentences that can be imposed upon juveniles all presuppose that a
juvenile is an individual with a chronological age under 18.").
184. See Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Minor Restrictions: Adolescence Across
Legal Disciplines, the Infancy Doctrine, and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 343, 374-75 (2012) (providing historical account of reduction of
age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen by state legislatures in 1970s).
185. See Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1125 (2012) ("In the United
States, most jurisdictions have a functional minimum age for the right to contract of eighteen years
old.").
186. See Bruce A. Boyer, Foster Care Reentry Laws: Mending the Safety Net for Emerging
Adults in the Transition to Independence, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 837, 850 n.66 (2016) (cataloging states
that do not extend jurisdiction beyond eighteen by statute, but provide some support for former
foster youth post-eighteen).
187. See id at 850 (recognizing administrative approach to extended service provision).
188. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-205(1) (2016) (providing for continuing jurisdiction of court).
189. See id § 19-3-205(2)(a) (listing considerations for extending jurisdiction past age eight-
een).
190. See id § 19-3-205(1) (providing for jurisdiction continuing until age twenty-one with no
specified change at age eighteen).
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direct wishes, but to represent their best interests.9 9 Upon turning eight-
een, youth continue in a "best interests" court system with the same
model of guardian ad litem representation, now stretching all the way
until age twenty-one if the court determines continued jurisdiction would
be best for them.192 Without changing system culture to match develop-
mentally-appropriate milestones for this transition-age population, we
run the risk of making age twenty-one the old cliff of age eighteen.
Indeed, the age of eighteen is both significant and totally insignifi-
cant, depending on our perspective.1 93 The law does not always exhibit
flexibility, and so for need of clarity, our system creates importance
around the chosen age.194 The dependency system does not consistently
match the line drawn in other legal contexts; yet, it also does not authen-
tically follow the developmental lessons that we know to be true for tran-
sition-age young people. Perhaps most critically, as some have recog-
nized, "The notion that a single line can be drawn between adolescence
and adulthood for different purposes under the law is at odds with devel-
opmental science."'9 5
B. The Current Status of Youth Rights
While the rights of parents and states' interests have been consist-
ently articulated in dependency cases,'9 6 the same cannot be said for the
rights of children. Children are thought to have "interests," while parents
are thought to have "rights."' 9 7 Many fear that affording rights to chil-
dren will only come at the expense of the rights of their parents, as if
parents have already cornered the market on rights with little to go
around. 198
Still others believe that the rights of children are subsumed by the
rights of their parents, or in their parents' absence, by the state under the
191. Id. § 19-3-203(3) (providing for appointment of guardian ad litem charged with represen-
tation of child's best interests).
192. Cf id §§ 19-3-203, -205 (providing for jurisdiction and legal representation with no
marked change at age eighteen).
193. Compare JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 15 (explaining that
change from adolescent to adult is not complete on eighteenth birthday), with Preston & Crowther,
supra note 184, at 374 (recognizing age of legal majority at age eighteen).
194. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (adopting eighteen as default distinc-
tion).
195. Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 583 (highlighting disconnect between law and re-
search).
196. For a discussion of the rights of parents and the State's parens patriae interest, see supra
notes 24-48 and accompanying text.
197. Compare supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text, with infra notes 202-89 and accom-
panying text.
198. See Howard Davidson, Children's Rights and American Law: A Response to What's
Wrong with Children's Rights, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 69, 70 (2006) (explaining lack of American
laws with "children's rights" in title).
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parens patriae doctrine.199 Under this viewpoint, children do not need
separate, independent rights.200 They are taken care of when the system
201
protects the rights of others. Such a view can be easily understood in a
system completely designed around child protection and best-interest
decision making.
When discussing the rights of parents, federal and state courts are
consistently clear in their definition: Parents have a right to the care, cus-
tody, and control of their children.2 02 This is the starting point for the
discussion of protections that children are thereby owed.203 Even in cases
where children have been recognized to have some independent status,
the "right" is not so easily defined; it is fluid based on the child's context
204
or the issues at stake in the particular court proceeding.
In Alabama, a court recognized, "Parents and their children share a
liberty interest in continued association with one another, i.e., a funda-
mental right to family integrity."205 In Colorado, children have protected
interests "in continuing family relationship[s] . . . [and] in a permanent,
secure, stable, and loving environment."206 Children in Florida have a
"fundamental liberty interest to be free of physical and emotional vio-
lence at the hands of [their] . . . most trusted caretaker."2 0 7 In Georgia,
children have a liberty interest in "maintaining the integrity of the family
unit and in having a relationship with [their] biological parents."2 08 Kan-
sas has noted a child's fundamental liberty interest in his or her parent-
age, reciprocal to a parent's interest in maintaining the familial relation-
ship with the child.209 Children in Massachusetts have an absolute inter-
est in "freedom from abusive or neglectful behavior."2 10 Texas acknowl-
199. Cf Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (establishing legal presumption that fit
parents act in children's best interests); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (noting
State's obligation to control children when parent is unable).
200. Cf Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 (recognizing rights of parents to make decisions for children
and limits on State intervention with no discussion of rights of children).
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., id. at 65 (noting constitutional right of parents to "care, custody, and control of
their children"); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (same); In re K.M., 653
N.W.2d 602, 607 (Iowa 2002) (same); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 297 (Me. 2000) (same).
203. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-69 (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), standard test to assess procedural due process owed to parents at termination of parental
rights hearings).
204. For a discussion of how the rights and interests of children are defined across the country,
see supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
205. J.B. v. DeKalb Cty. Dep't. of Human Res., 12 So. 3d 100, 115 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
206. See People ex rel. C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 607 (Colo. 1982) (identifying interests at stake in
termination of parental rights hearing).
207. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (second altera-
tion in original) (internal quotation omitted) (describing child's fundamental liberty interest).
208. See Kenny A. ex rel. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (discussing
constitutional interests of children).
209. See Ferguson v. Winston, 996 P.2d 841, 846 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (addressing fundamen-
tal liberty interests of parents and children in paternity action).
210. See Care & Protection of Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993, 998 (Mass. 1990) (emphasizing abso-
lute interest in freedom from harm compared to child's interest in family integrity, which is not
absolute).
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edges that children have an "interest in a final decision and thus place-
ment in a safe and stable home."2 1 1
There are countless other statements of recognition that youth too
have interests at stake in these proceedings.2 12 There is overlap amongst
213many, and yet no clear trumpeted statement of the right2. It is unclear
whether interests in these cases are equated to the rights of parents or are
mere factors in the "best interest" decision making itself. What is the
value of these expressions?
At times, the federal courts have attempted to wade into these
214murky waters2. In 1989, the United States Supreme Court heard the
case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices.215 In this case a boy and his mother sued county social workers
after the boy was severely beaten and permanently injured by his father
following reports made expressing concerns for the boy's safety.2 16 De-
spite the reports, the county failed to act in removing the boy from his
father's care.2 17 The boy brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, al-
leging that the Department's failure to act deprived him "of his liberty
interests in 'free[dom] from ... unjustified intrusions on personal securi-
ty"' under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 18 The
Court, however, rejected this argument and held that "nothing in the lan-
guage of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private ac-
tors."219
In doing so, the Supreme Court made a careful distinction relevant
to youth in state custody foster care.220 The Court found:
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains
an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself,
211. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 304 (Tex. 2002) (considering promotion of child's inter-
ests by Texas rules).
212. See, e.g., In re Dependency of M.S.R., 271 P.3d 234, 244 (Wash. 2012) (recognizing
fundamental liberty interests of children in termination proceedings, including "interest in being free
from unreasonable risk of harm and a right to reasonable safety; in maintaining the integrity of the
family relationships, . . . and in not being returned to (or placed into) an abusive environment over
which they have little voice or control").
213. Compare supra notes 205-12 and accompanying text, with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 65 (2000) (defining parents' fundamental right to care, custody and control of child).
214. See Dale Margolin Cecka, The Civil Rights of Sexuality Exploited Youth in Foster Care,
117 W. VA. L. REV. 1225, 1253-57 (2015) ("Foster children's rights while in custody of the state are
not well settled.").
215. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
216. Id. at 191-93 (recounting facts of case).
217. Id. at 192-93 (describing action taken by county department).
218. Id. at 194-95 (alteration in original) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673
(1977)).
219. Id at 195 (stating holding of Court).
220. See Taylor 1. Dudley, Bearing Injustice: Foster Care, Pregnancy Prevention, and the
Law, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 77, 96-97 (discussing applicability of DeShaney in other
contexts).
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and at the same time fails to provide for his basic needs-e.g., food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses
the substantive limits on state action set by . . . the Due Process
Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment].221
Since DeShaney, several courts have addressed violations of the
substantive due process rights of foster children.222 In 2003, the Wash-
223
ington Supreme Court heard the case of Braam ex rel. Braam v. State,
a class action filed against the State "in an effort to improve the lives of
foster children in the State's care."22 4 The plaintiffs in Braam specifically
challenged the State's practice of indiscriminately moving children from
placement to placement, in addition to the lack of appropriate mental
health treatment to meet the children's needs.225
The Braam case provided a solid opportunity to explore the land-
scape of the substantive due process rights of foster children across the
country.22 6 The Washington court concluded that "foster children have a
substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable risk of harm,
including a risk flowing from the lack of basic services, and a right to
,227
reasonable safety." Any violations of these rights would be measured
under the professional judgment standard-"whether the State's conduct
falls substantially short of the exercise of professional judgment, stand-
ards, or practices."22 8 Since Braam, other foster youth have sought relief,
with varying degrees of success, from violations of their substantive due
process right to be free from harm while in state custody.229
It is worth noting that the Braam court dismissed the plaintiffs'
claims based on state statutes.230 None of the dependency laws created a
private cause of action for youth.231 The court stated "that parties believ-
ing themselves aggrieved by [the State's] failure to abide by these [state]
statutes, including a foster child through an attorney or guardian ad litem,
will have an opportunity to raise the issue in the context of dependency
actions."232 The court similarly rejected claims under other federal child
221. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (distinguishing case at hand from case with child in state
custody); Cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25 (1982) (requiring State to provide neces-
sary services to involuntarily committed mental patients to ensure their "reasonable safety").
222. See, e.g., Cecka, supra note 214, at 1253-57 (recounting case law on foster child's right to
be free from harm while in state custody).
223. 81 P.3d 851 (Wash. 2003).
224. Id. at 854 (providing case background).
225. Id. at 855 (describing nature of claim).
226. See id. at 856-57 (providing string citation to persuasive authority on substantive due
process rights of foster children).
227. Id. at 857 (defining the substantive due process right).
228. Id. at 858 (identifying appropriate culpability standard for violations of children's substan-
tive due process rights).
229. See Cecka, supra note 214, at 1253-57 (providing case law summary).
230. See Braam, 81 P.3d at 863 (affirming trial court's dismissal of state claims).
231. Id.
232. Id. (identifying context of dependency case to be proper avenue for violations of state
statutes as opposed to separate cause of action).
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welfare laws, noting that the federal funding mandates of such laws did
not create an explicit cause of action.233
In addition, courts have also evaluated the procedural due process
rights of youth under the Fourteenth Amendment. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn
v. Perdue,234 a case heard by the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, was a class action brought by foster youth in Fulton
and DeKalb counties, asserting various violations of their due process
235rights under the Georgia constitution. Among their arguments, the
plaintiffs claimed that they had a constitutional right to counsel in all
deprivation cases, not just at the time of termination of parental rights
236hearings. The court recognized that foster youth in state custody were
"entitled to constitutionally adequate procedural due process when their
liberty or property rights [were] at stake."237 In Kenny A., the court de-
fined the youth's fundamental liberty interests at stake in such cases as "a
child's interest in his or her own safety, health, and well-being, as well as
an interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in having a
relationship with his or her biological parents."2 38 The process of taking a
child into state custody creates a "special relationship" that "gives rise to
rights to reasonably safe living conditions and services necessary to en-
sure protection from physical, psychological, and emotional harm."239
The court then conducted the three-part Mathews v. Eldridge test to
assess what process was owed in such cases.2 40 Ultimately, the Kenny A.
court concluded that children had a procedural due process right o coun-
241
sel under the Georgia constitution.
Thus, while courts have recognized substantive and procedural
rights of children in foster care, the historical landscape is varied in con-
sistency and enforceability. Future litigation will no doubt continue to
refine the rights, yet it is uncertain whether there will ever be one clear
right comparable to that of parents in such dependency cases.
More recently, in 2011, a class action suit, D.B. v. Richter,242 was
filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York on behalf of transi-
243tion-age youth in the foster care system. Specifically, the class in-
233. Id. at 863-65 (affirming trial court's dismissal of federal statutory claims).
234. 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (2005).
235. Id. at 1355-56 (stating facts of case).
236. Id. at 1357.
237. Id. at 1359 (recognizing procedural due process rights of children).
238. Id. at 1360 (articulating rights of foster children).
239. Id. (providing that fundamental liberty interests of child are at stake throughout the pro-
ceedings).
240. Id. at 1360-61 (discussing the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), analy-
sis).
241. Id. at 1360 (stating holding of court under Due Process Clause of Georgia Constitution).
242. Index No. 402759/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) filed Oct. 17, 2011.
243. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement at 1, D.B. v. Richter, Index No. 402759/11
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011), http://www.legal-
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volved all youth between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one who
were currently in foster care with a permanency goal of emancipation
(Another Permanent Planned Living Arrangement or APPLA) or who
1 244 Teato a ie gis h
left foster care to live on their own. The action was filed against the
New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) in an ef-
fort to help transition-age youth enforce their "right to receive help in
finding appropriate and adequate housing and to receive other help from
ACS until [their] 21st birthday."2 4 5 As a result of the case being filed, the
parties reached a settlement that required ACS to establish policies re-
garding services and support for youth transitioning out of foster care,
specifically around the area of housing.24 6
This case targeted the protections owed to transition-age youth in
247the dependency system. It raised additional questions about the rights
of this in-between age group of young people, as well as the enforceabil-
ity of rights bestowed on them.
C. The Strengthening Families Act and Foster Care Bills ofRights
Congress furthered the conversation around transition-age youth in
foster care, specifically their engagement in case planning and their
rights in the system, with the passage of the SFA in September 2014.248
The SFA is "designed to promote well-being and normalcy for youth in
foster care[,]" included provisions encouraging states to identify and
protect youth at risk of sex trafficking, to improve opportunities for
youth in foster care, to support permanency efforts through adoption
incentives, and to enhance international child support recovery efforts.249
In one key provision, the SFA called for states to implement a "rea-
sonable and prudent parent standard," which would allow foster parents
to make more of the day-to-day decisions for youth in their homes.2 50
The goal is to provide a sense of normalcy to foster youth by allowing
them to participate in extracurricular, cultural, and social activities with
aid.org/media/152814/d.b.%20v.%20richter/o20notice.english.pdf (providing notice of a proposed
settlement to all eligible youth).
244. See id. at 1; see also Proposed Class Action Settlement Averts the Danger of Homeless-
ness for Young People Aging Out of Foster Care, LEGAL AID Soc'Y (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://www.legal-
aid.org/en/mediaandpublicinformation/inthenews/proposedclassactionsettlementavertsthedangerofho
melessness.aspx (detailing news coverage of proposed class action).
245. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement, supra note 243 (asserting right of current and
former foster youth in case).
246. See id. at 2-4 (summarizing terms of proposed settlement).
247. Id. (identifying services to be provided to current and former foster youth).
248. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, 128
Stat. 1919 (2014) (codified as amended in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.).
249. See JENNIFER POKEMPNER ET AL., PROMOTING NORMALCY FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN
FOSTER CARE 2 (2015) (summarizing general provisions of SFA); see also Preventing Sex Traffick-
ing and Strengthening Families Act § 2 (providing Table of Contents for Act's provisions).
250. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act § 111 (establishing standard
for supporting normalcy for children in foster care).
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their peers.25 1 It is a recognition that youth in foster care still need to just
be kids.2 52
Other provisions seek to empower youth ages fourteen and older to
engage in their own dependency cases.2 53 The SFA specifies that he case
plan "shall be developed in consultation with the child [age fourteen or
older] and, at the option of the child, with up to 2 members of the case
planning team who are chosen by the child and who are not a foster par-
ent of, or caseworker for, the child."25 4 This provision seems to reflect an
understanding of the adolescent's cognitive capacities for decision mak-
255ing at these ages. With guidance and opportunity, they are able to par-
ticipate in these decisions.
The SFA also amended the federal language to describe this process
as "transition planning for a successful adulthood," as opposed to transi-
tion planning for "independent living." 2 56 This also reflects changing
views around successful outcomes for these youth, recognizing that
adults do not, in fact, live independently, but rather live "interdependent-
ly" with support from many permanent connections with friends and
family.257
In the discussion of furthering youth rights, the essential provision,
the "List of Rights" addition, reads:
(b) List of Rights.-The case plan for any child in foster care under
the responsibility of the State who has attained 14 years of age shall
include-
(1) a document that describes the rights of the child with respect to
education, health, visitation, and court participation, the right to be
provided with the documents specified in section 475(5)(I) in accord-
ance with that section, and the right to stay safe and avoid exploita-
tion; and
251. Id.; POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 8-21 (analyzing implementation strategies for
normalcy provisions).
252. Cf POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 5 ("Indeed, normalcy for youth means being
able to do what is considered 'routine' for many teenagers .... .").
253. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act § 113 (providing for involve-
ment of older foster youth in their own case planning).
254. Id. (designing case planning with emphasis on youth engagement).
255. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (discussing adolescent capacity for logical
decision making).
256. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act § 113 (amending terminology
to reflect changing views).
257. Jill K. Jensen, Fostering Interdependence: A Family-Centered Approach to Help Youth
Aging Out of Foster Care, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 329, 329-30 (2004) ("Programs
that focus on the concept of 'independent living' should be redefined as preparation for 'interde-
pendent living."'); id at 330 ("Interdependent living ... is defined as 'being able to carry out man-
agement tasks of daily life and having a productive quality of life through positive or appropriate
interaction with individuals, groups, organizations, and social systems."' (quoting ANTHONY N.
MALUCCIO ET AL., PREPARING ADOLESCENTS FOR LIFE AFTER FOSTER CARE: THE CENTRAL ROLE
OF FOSTER PARENTS 10 (1990))).
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(2) a signed acknowledgment by the child that the child has been
provided with a copy of the document and that the rights contained in
the document have been explained to the child in an age-appropriate
258
way.
The effective date for this provision was September 29, 2015, with a
delayed date permitted if state legislation was required.259
A collaborative brief on effective implementation of the SFA articu-
260
lated the rationale behind these provisions. With regard to case plan-
ning, the SFA represents a "recognition that young people should be in-
cluded in these important processes and that youth as young as age 14
can have a very informed perspective that can lead to better permanency
outcomes and compliance with the case plan."2 61 Providing youth with
their rights is intended to "strengthen[] their self-sufficiency and pre-
pare[] them for a successful transition out of foster care and into adult-
hood."262 While the report recommends that the Department of Health
and Human Services should provide a model List of Rights, it acknowl-
edges the absence of a clear list in the SFA itself.26
With this general mandate, the list of rights in each state may look
somewhat different from one another, so long as they cover the essential
topics-education, health, visitation, and court participation.264 Even
before the enactment of the SFA, a number of states enacted Foster Chil-
dren Bill of Rights.26 5 With the SFA's passage, additional states have
sought to adopt such lists in an attempt to define the rights of foster chil-
26
dren and foster parents and satisfy the SFA's requirements.266 Some of
these Bills of Rights are enacted through state statute, others find their
way in departmental policy or regulation.2 67
258. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act § 113 (establishing "List of
Rights" provision).
259. See CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE PREVENTING SEX TRAFFICKING
AND STRENGTHENING FAMILIES ACT (P.L. 113-183) TO BENEFIT CHILDREN AND YOUTH 26 (2015).
260. Id. at 8-9 (stating it was a "collaborative effort of Children's Defense Fund, Child Wel-
fare League of America, First Focus, Generations United, Foster Family-based Treatment Associa-
tion, and Voice for Adoption").
261. Id. at 26.
262. Id.
263. See id at 27 ("It would be helpful for HHS to provide a model for the List of Rights.").
264. POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 14 ("Youth should know what the law requires and
allows. They should be supported in advocating for themselves on all important issues, including
normalcy, family visitation, educational choices, and health care.").
265. See Jill Reyes, Child Welfare Bills of Rights for Foster Children, 31 CHILD L. PRAC. 156,
156 (2012) (discussing state trend to pass child welfare bills of rights prior to passage of any federal
legislation).
266. Foster Care Bill of Rights, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/foster-care-bill-of-rights.aspx (noting pending state
legislation to define rights of foster children and parents).
267. See Reyes, supra note 265 (noting use of statute of local child welfare agency policy to
create bills of rights).
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On the whole, such lists of rights are fairly benign. They generally
set forth expectations for the foster care system at large in terms of how
children in its care should be treated.268 Such bills often include "provi-
sions regarding frequent contact with parents, siblings, and family mem-
bers, foster youth's access to their advocates and the courts, and partici-
pation in age-appropriate school activities.
The ABA Center on Children and the Law has "also assessed which
states' child welfare bill of rights include: protection against abuse or
corporal punishment, access to healthcare, protections against excessive
medication, and preparation for independence."270 As of 2012, only five
states-California, Colorado, Maryland, Nevada, and Pennsylvania-
included all four of these topics in their statutes, while six additional
states-Hawaii, Maine, New Mexico, New York, Texas, and Wiscon-
sin-incorporated these provisions into their departmental policies.2 7'
The focus of such lists is primarily on what youth in foster care de-
serve: safe and healthy placements where their day-to-day needs are
272 273met, an explanation of why they are in care, the ability to participate
in case planning,274 educational stability,275 freedom from abuse or ne-
glect,276 sibling contact,277 pflvacy,278 prompt access to any needed
treatment or services,279 visitation with birth parents,280 representation of
268. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131D-10.1(b) (2016) ("The purpose of this Article is to
assign the authority to protect the health, safety and well-being of children separated from or being
cared for away from their families.").
269. See Reyes, supra note 265 (noting that most states have policy adopting "Bill of Rights
for Foster Children" from Philadelphia in 1973).
270. Id.
271. Id. (listing states with comprehensive bill of rights in either statute or policy).
272. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-529(A)(2) (2016) (stating the right to "live in a safe,
healthy and comfortable placement"); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16001.9(a)(1) (2016) (stating the
right to "live in a safe, healthy, and comfortable home").
273. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-529(A)(3) (stating the right to "know why the child
is in foster care and what will happen to the child and the child's family, including siblings, and case
plans").
274. See, e.g., II PA. CONS. STAT. § 2633(16) (2011) (discussing the right to involvement in
case planning and court participation); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.008(b)(14) (West 2017) (dis-
cussing the right to participation in or development of treatment plans).
275. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-113 (2016) (discussing the right to continuity of educa-
tional services); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2633 (noting the right to educational stability); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-38-10 (2016) (discussing the right to educational services).
276. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 587A-3(a)(1) (2016) (stating the right to live in home "free
from physical, psychological, sexual, and other abuse"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131D-10.1(a)(1) (2016)
(stating the right to "safe foster home free of violence, abuse, neglect, and danger").
277. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-10a(a) (2016) (ensuring the right to sibling visitation);
FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(15) (2016) (ensuring the right to regular sibling contact).
278. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2522(a)(1 1) (2016) (granting right to "have their
confidentiality protected as required by state and federal law"); II PA. CONS. STAT. § 2633(17)
(granting right to confidentiality).
279. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2522(4) (granting right to access treatment necessary
to meet needs); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.4085(7) (2016) (establishing goal of dependent children
receiving necessary treatment).
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their voices in court,28 1 access to personal possessions,2 82 freedom from
discrimination,283 independent living services,284 lifelong connections
with kin,285 and opportunities to experience normalcy.286
The SFA requires states to provide these lists (or those similar) to
youth using youth-friendly language.28 7 This is documented by having
288the youth's signature acknowledging receipt of the rights. While this
documentation addresses notification to youth of their rights, concerns
remain regarding enforcement.2 89
D. The Meaning ofRights
The term "Bill of Rights" is an interesting one. Historically, it refer-
enced the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution, encom-
passing a "list of treasured liberties."29 0 The original Bill of Rights was
thought to be "the product of the bitter struggles of men and women who
loved freedom and hated tyranny."291 It was the recognition of almost
inherent rights.292
The various state Bills of Rights for foster youth are similarly lofty
in nature, though often lacking in protections. Unfortunately, these state
280. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-3(a)(3) (ensuring a child's right to contact with par-
ents); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(e) (West 2016) (establishing a right for children placed outside their
home to visit their parents).
281. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16001.9(a)(1 7) (2016) (establishing policy of foster
children's right to "attend court hearings and speak to the judge"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
263.008(b)(13) (2016) (noting right to participation in court).
282. See, e.g., MASS. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, FOSTER CHILD BILL OF RIGHTS (high-
lighting right to access in policy bill of rights).
283. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16001.9(a)(23) (establishing policy or foster chil-
dren's right not to be subjected to discrimination or harassment); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2633(2)
(granting right to "[f]reedom from discrimination because of race, color, religion, disability, national
origin, age or gender").
284. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2522(a)(12) (granting right to independent living
services beginning at age sixteen); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-3(a)(10) (ensuring a child's right to
age-appropriate life skills training and transition planning starting at age twelve).
285. See, e.g., MASS. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 282 (highlighting right to
receive support in maintaining positive connections with relatives).
286. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-529(a)(6) (2016) (establishing right to attend "com-
munity, school and religious" activities); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-113(b) (2016) (establishing rights
related to education).
287. See POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 9 (discussing details of Act's "list of rights"
provision).
288. See 42 U.S.C. § 675a(b)(2) (2012) (requiring "signed acknowledgement by the child").
289. See POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 10, 10 n.46 (recognizing that child's acknowl-
edgement of receipt does not address enforcement of child's right).
290. See Garrett Epps, Speech, The Bill ofRights, 82 OR. L. REV. 517, 521 (2003) (delivering
history of the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution).
291. See Frank H. Elmore, Liberty Under the Bill of Rights, 50 FED. RULES DECISIONS 65, 65
(1970) (presenting historical account of Bill of Rights).
292. See id. at 66 (describing Bill of Rights amendments as "most essential portions of the
Constitution").
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Bills of Rights "typically do not create enforceable rights or specify any
means for their enforcement."293
In Colorado, for example, the statute specifically reads that the leg-
islature only intended the list as "guidelines to promote the physical,
mental, social, and emotional development of youth in foster care and to
prepare them for a successful transition back into their families or the
community.294 These guidelines may be limited in application "to rea-
sonable periods during the day or restricted according to the routine of
foster care homes to ensure the protection of children and foster fami-
lies." As such, the rights are neither absolute nor enforceable.295
In Florida, the statutory list delineates that it establishes "goals and
not rights."296 It shall not "be interpreted as requiring the delivery of any
particular service or level of service in excess of existing appropria-
tions[,]" nor shall it create any "cause of action against the state ....
Similarly, Hawaii's list establishes "guiding principles."29 8 Arizona and
North Carolina make clear that any violations do not create causes of
action.299 These are expectations of care, meant more so to inform foster
parents and state agencies of their enduring obligations to youth, not to
allow youth to have an equal and enforceable stake in the proceedings.
A few states have described grievance procedures for violations of
any listed rights, falling short, however, of creating separate causes of
action. In Delaware, aggrieved youth "may motion the court ... for ap-
propriate equitable relief."3 00 Nevada provides rights of redress. Penn-
sylvania allows for filing of a grievance in accordance with county poli-
cy.302 Youth in Rhode Island can seek appropriate equitable relief from
the family court.303 In Montana, youth should contact the Foster Care
304
Program Officer, who will follow-up on their concerns.
Thus far, there have been few cases across the country actually liti-
gating the rights listed in the various state Bills of Rights. In the Arizona
293. See POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 10 (noting lack of creation of enforceable
rights).
294. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-7-101(2) (2016) (setting limits on enforceability).
295. See id.
296. FLA. STAT. § 39.4085 (2016).
297. Id. (limiting enforceability of Bill of Rights).
298. HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-3(a) (2016).
299. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-529(C) (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131D-10.1(a) (2016).
300. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2522(b) (2016) (establishing remedy).
301. NEV. REV. STAT. § 432.550 (2015) (allowing child to redress alleged violation with foster
care provider or employee, agency, juvenile court, guardian ad litem or attorney for child).
302. 11 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2633(24H25) (2016) (establishing grievance process).
303. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-72-15(m) (2016) (providing remedy for child aggrieved by violation
of bill of rights).
304. MONT. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD & FAM. SERVS. Div., THE
POLICY OF THE STATE OF MONTANA REGARDING RIGHTS OF YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE (2015),
http://dphhs.mt.gov/CFSD.aspx (follow "Montana Foster Youth Rights" hyperlink) (establishing
process for youth to express concerns about care or treatment).
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case of K.D. v. Hoffman,305 a thirteen-year-old argued that the court vio-
lated her rights when it denied her request to attend and testify at a ter-
mination of parental rights hearing.3 06 She asserted that the Arizona Bill
of Rights for Children and Youth in Foster Care Act (AZ Bill of Rights
Act) gave her the right to "attend the ... court hearing and speak to the
judge."307 Despite this argument, the Arizona Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the legislature did not intend to grant youth in foster care ab-
solute rights in passing the AZ Bill of Rights Act, and thus the act estab-
lished no legally enforceable right or cause of action.30s
New Jersey, on the other hand, clearly recognizes a private cause of
action for violations of the Children's Bill of Rights.309 In KJ. v. Divi-
sion of Youth and Family Services,310 a federal district court of the Dis-
trict of New Jersey discussed the Bill of Rights in detail.3 1' It noted that
the "Act outlines the State's responsibilities when undertaking to protect
children by placing them outside of the home."3 12 It recognized this as an
313affirmative obligation of the State. It was designed to "protect the most
fundamental rights of children placed outside the home[,]" recognizing
the rights of youth independent of their parents.314
Moreover, the court noted that the Child Placement Bill of Rights
Act was created separately from the rest of the child welfare laws, "sug-
gesting that it was meant to provide a separate remedy."3 15 Despite a lack
of any articulation of a remedy within the Act itself, the court held that it
nonetheless provided a private right of action, as doing so was "proper
and necessary."316 Thus, in New Jersey, youth have equitable access to
enforcement of their rights.
In sum, the SFA provides that youth in every state receive a copy of
their rights; yet for the vast majority of youth across the country, having
"rights" means something less than a guarantee-whether through a bill
305. 359 P.3d 1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
306. See id at 1023 (describing procedural history and basis of claim).
307. See id. at 1023-24 (relying on alleged violation of subsection (A)(16) of Bill of Rights to
assert cause of action).
308. Id. at 1024 (limiting enforceability of Arizona Bill of Rights for Children and Youth in
Foster Care Act).
309. K.J. v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 363 F. Supp. 2d, 728, 743-48 (D.N.J. 2005) (con-
sidering federal due process claims and state law claims of foster youth).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 741-45.
312. Id. at 741 (referencing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-1 to 9:6B-6 (West 2016)).
313. Id. at 742 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-2(b) (West 2016)).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 741.
316. Id. at 745 ("[T]he Child Placement Bill of Rights Act seeks to remedy the harm which
arises when the State agencies and the placement system fail to carry out the State's affirmative
obligation to protect the fundamental rights of the children entrusted to its care.").
317. Id.
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of rights or through case law. 1 Indeed, "mere encouragement and policy
promulgation without any accompanying enforcement mechanism is not
likely to bring about dramatic improvements for foster youth." 3 19
IV. THE CHANGING CULTURE OF A LONG-STANDING SYSTEM
In a myriad of ways, the SFA causes advocates to engage in conver-
sations about he value of transition-age youth. It recognizes the essential
piece they bring to case planning for their own life outcomes.3 20 it
acknowledges that this age group should be focused on transitioning with
supportive connections, not ultimate day-to-day independence.3 21 It re-
quires from states a declaration of expectations as to what .youth deserve
from a system legally obligated to support their well-being.3 22
Each of these elements of the Act is crucial to creating a dependen-
cy system built around the emerging adulthood of this age group in the
pursuit of achieving better outcomes for their futures. The SFA, howev-
er, is just the beginning. While it provides for the rights of youth by
name, it does little to encourage the enforceability of such rights, or even
to create accountability for the promises that such lists of rights make to
youth.
Our child welfare history shows our progression in viewpoint re-
323garding youth. Since the time of Gault, the delinquency system has
been two steps ahead in considering the status of young people, specifi-
cally the status of their development and decision-making capacity. 324it
is time for the dependency system to follow suit, moving past the pater-
nalistic paradigms and instead considering this age group's need for an
environment of both independence and support.
A. A Look Towards Developmental Appropriateness
Much of this discussion is less about specific laws or policies, and
ultimately, more about culture change in our dependency systems. Judg-
es are crucial in this process-asking questions of youth (and other par-
ties) rooted in a knowledge of developmental research, giving young
people an equal place at the table, and holding them, their families, and
318. For a discussion of the rights of transition-age youth both in bills of rights and in case law,
see supra notes 200-90 and accompanying text.
319. Paul Jacobson, Note, Promoting "Normalcy" for Foster Children: The Preventing Sex
Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, 81 Mo. L. REv. 251, 263 (2016).
320. See Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, §
113(a), 128 Stat. 1919, 1928 (2014) (providing for greater engagement of older youth in case plan-
ning).
321. See id. § 113(c) (amending terminology to focus on transition planning).
322. See id. § 113(d) (requiring states to provide a "list of rights").
323. See Ventrell, supra note 16, at 192-93 (discussing change in view as to children's status).
324. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (describing delinquency court's shift to acknowl-
edging youth as rights-based individuals).
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their case professionals accountable for their actions. Creating a devel-
opmentally-appropriate system does not mean making excuses for the
"bad" choices of our youth; it means establishing an environment where
young people can try new things, make mistakes, and have support in
learning from them.
One author, Emily Buss, recently called for the adoption of a new
lens for the law around minors: "developmental jurisprudence."3 2 6 This is
''an examination of the role of law as a developmental agent-an agent
that shapes how children grow up .... 327 Essentially, this view advo-
cates that "in all the domains in which law is already operating, it should
be more universally attuned to its childrearing impact."328 Professor Buss
explains the role of the law in the development of older youth, specifical-
ly the message that we send to youth about their place in society.32 9
"[Y]oung people are conditioned to assume the status of outsider: They
are not a part of the social and professional community to which all the
court personnel, their own lawyers included, belong, and they are not
included in the hearings in any meaningful way." 3 3 0 This experience
"perpetuates the youth's dependent status in the system" and "deprives
them of an important opportunity to begin, in a highly structured and
supported environment, to exercise decision-making authority over their
own lives." 33 1 This is exactly the result that we, as a system, should seek
to avoid.
B. Recommendations for Change
Changes to our system start with changes to our courts, our laws
and policies, and our practices. We must be intentional in evaluating how
our status quo supports or hinders the successful transition of older youth
as they exit the child welfare system.
1. The Meaningful Participation of Youth
The dependency system has spent much time and attention in recent
years on youth attending court. Now, courts must move beyond attend-
ance and look for meaningful participation. Professionals must spend the
325. See, e.g., Jennifer Pokempner, Implementing the Older Youth Permanency Provisions of
the Strengthening Families Act. The Court's Role, 35 CHILD L. PRAc. 65, 73-74 (providing lists of
questions court can ask regarding older youth permanency provisions of the SFA).
326. Emily Buss, Developmental Jurisprudence, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 741, 741 (2016) (establish-
ing new perspective on laws regarding minors).
327. Id. at 751.
328. Id. at 755 (explaining that developmental jurisprudence looks to "parenting model," just
as therapeutic jurisprudence looks to "treatment model").




time with youth-both fully preparing them prior to court and fully de-
briefing the experience with them after the hearing.332
Keeping in mind the research discussed above, there must be oppor-
tunities for young people to practice deliberative decision making, free
from social influences and supported by "consultants who can provide
objective information about the costs and benefits . .. ."33 This is the
time when transition-age youth have the ability to create new, healthy
brain pathways and prune those pathways that have not proven success-
ful. 334 Courts can support these opportunities by asking attorneys and
other professionals how decisions have been made and what the role of
the youth has been in such processes.33 5
2. A Meaningful Time Period for Transition
The results of the Midwest Study demonstrated that with additional
time and support in their transition, young people can have greater suc-
cess in their life outcomes.3 36 This concept informed the Fostering Con-
nections Act's extension of federal funding for young people between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-one who are pursuing important goals. 33 As
states have implemented the Fostering Connections Act and extended the
court's jurisdiction, they have done so in a number of developmentally-
appropriate ways.338 One option is to design the extended foster care sys-
tem around an opt-in or opt-out provision.339 This provision recognizes
that in most states, young people are legal adults at the age of eighteen.340
The opt-in or opt-out provision takes notice of that age, requiring foster
youth in the system at age eighteen to either choose to remain in the sys-
tem (opt-in) or choose to exit the system (opt-out). This is about consent.
332. See ELIZABETH WHITNEY BARNES ET AL., SEEN, HEARD, AND ENGAGED: CHILDREN IN
DEPENDENCY COURT HEARINGS 8-11 (2012) (detailing benefits of children's attendance in court
and addressing common concerns).
333. See Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 592; see also JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18,
supra note 1, at 12-14 (offering ten key elements to effective case planning with transition-age
youth).
334. See Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 592 (explaining supports needed in logical decision
making).
335. See, e.g., Pokempner, supra note 325 (emphasizing the court's role in the process).
336. See WEINBERGER ET AL., supra note 84, at 5-6 (describing "[a] process of competitive
elimination").
337. See COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 115, at 87-88 (comparing Illinois results with Iowa and
Wisconsin results).
338. See COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 1-2 (noting impact of the Midwest Study on
federal legislation).
339. Compare ALL. FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS ET AL., ASSEMBLY BILL 12 PRIMER 9 (2014),
http://www.cafosteringconnections.org/wp2/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/AB-12-Primer Updated-I-
1-14.pdf (characterizing California's extended care as "opt-out" program, meaning that youth's
foster care "will be extended past age 18 unless s/he elects to exit care"), with Fostering Connections
to Success Act's Older Youth Extensions in Pennsylvania, JUVENILE L. CTR.,
http://www.jlc.org/fosteringconnections#conditions (last updated July 28, 2015) (providing opt-in
choice for young people to remain in the system).
340. Cf JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18, supra note 1, at 4 (illustrating developmentally-
appropriate legal framework for young people between ages eighteen and twenty-one).
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Either way, such a statutory provision requires the courts and the child
welfare agencies to take note that, specifically at eighteen when the legal
stakes become higher in many other domains, the dependency system
also values the informed decision making of young people.
Hand in hand with this type of provision, many states have also
adopted a "reentry" option. 341 This allows young people who choose to
leave the dependency system after the age of eighteen the ability to re-
enter the system to receive services and supports until the age of twenty-
one.342 It gives them the extra time to work on their goals, such as school,
job training, or employment.343 Re-entry is the developmentally-
appropriate mechanism whereby youth can make a (hopefully informed)
decision to try the world on their own, while simultaneously benefiting
from an existing safety net if they need additional support.344
Certainly, extension of foster care jurisdiction with its accompany-
ing provisions comes with its own challenges. This is a means, however,
to evaluate state laws and policies and bring developmental science into
the dependency world.
3. Meaningful Legal Representation
The SFA calls for recognition of the rights of young people in de-
pendency cases. With rights comes status, along with procedural protec-
tions. If the system intends to provide young people an equitable voice in
the proceedings, it must do that through effective counsel. The right to
counsel for children in dependency cases was well-analyzed by the Ken-
ny A. court, discussed above, as a procedural due process right.3 45 For
transition-age youth, the developmentally-appropriate choice is for that
counsel to be client-directed, as opposed to representing the youth's best
interests.3 46 The youth's attorney can be that sound consultant advising
the youth of the costs and benefits of various decisions. With this sup-
port, young people can be empowered to strengthen their decision-
making capacity in a safe environment.
341. Boyer, supra note 186, at 839, 857-59 (exploring foster care reentry laws).
342. See id at 839 (providing that roughly half of states allow young people to return to foster
care "after some form of trial independence").
343. See id. at 858-60 (explaining that many state statutes or procedures governing reentry
require youth to commit to satisfying activity under Fostering Connections Act as a condition).
344. Id. at 839 ("The safety net embodied by these reentry or trial independence programs
appropriately acknowledges many of the unique challenges faced by youth seeking to navigate the
difficult transition from foster care to independence.")..
345. Kenny A. ex rel Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (upholding
right to counsel "under the Due Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution").
346. See JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, FOSTER CARE TO 21: DOING IT RIGHT
5 (2011) ("Legal representation must be youth-driven, responsive, and respectful of the unique needs
of each young person.").
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CONCLUSION
Transition-age youth in foster care have immeasurable challenges
ahead of them as they exit a system that has often made decisions for
them. Historically, the dependency courts have sent these youth count-
less messages of working "about" them and "for" them, rarely messages
of working "with" them. The legal landscape generally provides these
youth with a lesser voice than their parents, or even than the state, in
determining what is "best" for them.
With the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families
Act (the SFA), Congress opened the door for states, courts, and profes-
sionals to have deeper conversations about how youth are encouraged-
or sometimes hindered-in their transition process.
Maya Angelou is often quoted as saying, "I did then what I knew
how to do. Now that I know better, I do better."347 Today, we have more
research than ever on the adolescent brain, decision-making capacity,
348and life outcomes upon emancipation. We now know better about
what our systems are doing well and what we are failing to do. The SFA
gives us an opportunity to turn this knowledge into practice and do better
for transition-age youth in our foster care system.
347. J.N. Salters, 35 Maya Angelou Quotes That Changed My Life, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG
(May 29, 2014, 2:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jn-salters/35-maya-angelou-quotes-
th b_5412166.html.
348. For a discussion of the research surrounding adolescent development a d the longitudinal
life outcomes of young people exiting the foster care system, see supra notes 84-132, 147-76 and
accompanying text.
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